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Invited guests, from among this list:

DCI
DDCI
Rick Burt (State)
Jack Meatlock (NSC)
Bill Odom (Army)
Don Gregg (V.P.'s office)
Bob Osgood (State)
Jim Williams (DIA)

[redacted]

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Suggestions for the NIC Conference

Besides the obvious questions we are always concerned about, I suggest we examine the following proposition: (1) We produce too many National Estimates; and (2) the Community produces too little military analysis on third country wars.

Although I believe National Estimates have improved a great deal in quality and relevance to policy issues, I submit a fair number of them should not be prepared as National Estimates, or, if they were, should be defined more narrowly. I very much doubt that, in the political and economic areas, addressing an issue as a National Estimate per se gives it more credence and influence downtown than if it were addressed in a DI Intelligence Assessment or as an informal DI or NIC memorandum. And where the interagency process does give an assessment somewhat more influence, it may not be worth the added time and cost required. Consequently, I believe that the following questions be asked before a proposal is approved as an NIE (or SNIE): Why should this paper be an NIE? and/or: If a NIE on this general subject is appropriate, which questions should it address?

There are several possible reasons for preparing a NIE. These include:

- o A felt need among key consumers for a Community product; this is generally the case for military estimates.
- o The existence of substantial expertise in several intelligence agencies on a topic of major policy concern.
- o Known significant differences of views among agencies which could make a substantial difference to an assessment of a major issue.
- o In some cases, the inability or unwillingness of individual intelligence components to address a major issue in a sufficiently broad and integrated fashion.

In a perfect world, NIEs should be brief and should focus on the critical questions about which top policymakers are uncertain. They should be designed mainly at helping the policy community think about a problem and should focus on major judgments and judgmental differences. Detailed information and analysis in principle should have been prepared by the various departments in building block studies. In practice, this ideal is often unattainable, but we should try to come as close to it as possible.

With respect to military analysis, especially on Third World countries, the DI tradition is basically repertorial. This tradition goes back to the Current Intelligence Division of OSR, and has been carried on in the area offices since the reorganization. There is little analysis of

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military strategy, tactics, or performance, in minor wars, or even in major ones such as the Iran-Iraq war. Indeed, most analysts do not have the background to assess land or sea engagements from the point of view of military commanders.

A dramatic exception to this general rule is Ted Atkeson's two outstanding articles on the Falklands conflict, but unfortunately the exceptions bring out the inadequacy of most other intelligence products on military issues even more starkly. For example, I do not get any clear impression of the capabilities and performance of the opposing sides in Chad. And other than counting units and numbers of equipment, I get little sense of how effectively the Iranians and Iraqis are employing their manpower and firepower in their war. An example of bad military analysis was a recent NESA article on an Iranian air threat against the Southern Gulf. The article pointed to the destruction of the Iraqi off-shore oil terminals as an indication of Iranian capabilites. In fact, these terminals were destroyed by landing forces on the terminals and blowing them up, not by air attack. Except for destroying a few storage tanks, the sustained Iranian air attacks early in the war were generally ineffective. It would have been useful to learn something about the efficiency of Iranian pilots, and whether or not Iranian capabilities had improved over the past three years against specialized targets.

Good concrete suggestions on how to solve this problem are beyond my ken, but I believe it should be raised so that more knowledgeable people, like Ted Atkeson, can address it.

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

NIC #01535-84
7 March 1984

NOTE FOR: C/NIC

FROM : [redacted]
Acting NIO/GPF

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SUBJECT : Subject for NIC Retreat, 21-22 Mar 84

Suggest following item [redacted]

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"Selling the Estimate"

Has the NIC fulfilled its obligation when an estimate is published? Too often we have found that policymakers receive estimates late or not at all because of haphazard distribution within recipient government agencies. Could we take a more active role in working with these agencies to ensure wide distribution and by sending drafters out to brief the findings of key estimates?

[redacted]

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→ c/NIC

NIO/W

DDI-0154984

6 March 1984

To: Chairman, NIC

Subject: Spring Retreat

-- I am very supportive of the "retreat" concept. I've used and been involved in this management technique many times and have known no failures. However, the most success comes from having some structure.

-- To reiterate suggestions made a month ago:

Discussion of forecasting, using the SRP review of estimates, and perhaps our review of the '83 Forecasts. We have to find ways of departing from the mainstream and perhaps being less risk aversive.

One hour devoted to "The Warning Brief." [redacted] has our formal presentation well honed and I believe that it would be of more than passing interest to our colleagues and might well generate significant discussion.

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--Issues of process also need to be discussed to include: the medium, the audience, staffing the process, and relationships with DDI, DIA, NSA and other players.

--Discussion of relationships with policy side of house would also be of use.

D.Y.McManis

cc: NIO/AL (Ford)

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DDI 01525/84

6 March 1984

National Intelligence Council

NOTE FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NIC

SUBJECT: Ideas for Discussion during [redacted]

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I suggest the following topics for discussion:

-- Innovative ways to prepare NIEs and to make them shorter and less burdensome on analysts. For example a small team might interview knowledgable persons then prepare a first draft for review.

-- How to obtain greater analytic support from the Community other than CIA. For example, a senior person from each component of the IC might meet with the NIC to obtain a better understanding of its operation and needs.

-- The advantage of the NIC sponsoring debates on certain critical issues. The debaters might be persons from within or outside the Community.

Julian C. Nall
NIO for S&T

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #01517-84
6 March 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bob Gates

FROM: [redacted] STAT

SUBJECT: Suggestions for NIC Retreat

1. Is there value in inviting a principal speaker who might stretch our minds a little on a subject of interest to everyone? In 1982 we had a principal speaker-the DCI-and in 1983 we had a number of invited observers from the Intelligence Community who spoke informally. If we elect to invite a speaker, why not choose either a provocative speaker, such as Ed Luttvak, or a speaker qualified to address the uses of the NIC product, such as Larry Eagleburger?

2. The agenda could include three broad topics:

Improving the Estimative Process; NIC Operations; and Towards Defining the Role of the NIO.

Improving the Estimative Process.

We could usefully discuss whether we need new products or a change in the mix of old products. For example, should we prepare more short Interagency Intelligence Assessments and fewer long National Intelligence Estimates?

-- Should we expand the forced feeding of the most senior leaders by sending more specially printed Key Judgments from Estimates to such leaders? What about the NIC Memorandum? Does it serve a useful purpose? What customer is it aimed at?

-- The procedures for preparing Estimates have become encumbered with an inordinate amount of memo writing and movement of paper. What can we do to simplify this? Can some of the steps be eliminated?

CL BY SIGNER
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-- What is the proper place of the AG? Should it grow or is it the right size already? Would there be merit in encouraging DIA to establish an AG, perhaps employing retired Intelligence Community professionals under contract with the objective of expanding the drafting pool outside of CIA?

NIC Housekeeping.

There are a number of subjects that might be discussed under this heading.

-- Should staff meetings be used to discuss operational matters--meetings and briefings that NIOs are attending and giving--or should they be devoted to substance--what is happening in Lebanon? Should the Tuesday meeting be devoted to, say, operational matters and the Thursday meeting be devoted to, say, substantive matters?

-- Can a collegial use be found for the NIC? This is a question that has been addressed unsuccessfully in the past. These efforts show that the NIC cannot successfully address Estimative questions like Soviet energy output, but could the NIC address intelligence questions, such as how to improve Intelligence Community operations in some particular sector? For example, could the NIC collectively study specific problems in intelligence collection and analysis and then prepare a collegial report for the DCI?

-- Would the NIC benefit from establishing a typing pool that could accept the overflow from individual NIO offices? Such a pool, if equipped to handle either typewritten drafts or Lanier tapes, could relieve some of the pressure on our over-burdened secretaries.

Towards a Definition of the Role of the NIO.

Although many of us even go so far as to lecture to OTE classes on the role of the NIO, no precise definition exists. When acting as chairman of an Estimate, the NIO's role is explicit. But other functions are less clearly defined.

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-- As an advisor to the DCI on the NIO's area of competence, the NIO's role is ambiguous. Does he wear only an analytical hat or should he, at times, represent the interests of the DDO? What about the DDS&T? The DDCI says that organizations work best that face away from each other, yet with many NIOs focusing so much of their attention on providing analytical advice to the DCI, it is nearly impossible to "face away" from the DDI. If the NIO's advisory role involved the DDO and DDS&T more, what would be the benefit to the DCI?

-- The NIO is the DCI's representative to a host of non-CIA constituencies, among them the Intelligence Community, where the NIO's role is clear; the policy community, where each NIO approaches his job differently; the Congress, where the NIO appears sometimes as Community representative, sometimes as CIA representative and sometimes as de facto DDI representative; and finally to circles outside the Community such as academia and business. Is there merit in tidying up this representative role somewhat?

STAT

cc: Graham Fuller
Larry Gershwin
Hal Ford

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